

**G. S. RAKOVSKI NATIONAL DEFENSE ACADEMY  
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH INSTITUTE**

# **INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

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# INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN – A PIVOTAL NATO MISSION, AND SOME LESSONS LEARNED<sup>114</sup>

*Peter Dimitrov*<sup>115</sup>

## 1. Introduction

Technological revolution and globalization have brought new challenges to the mankind. Increased industrial production and harmful emissions to atmosphere are degrading constantly our environment and are exhausting at a hectic pace worlds' natural resources. Our countries are facing grim energy deficiencies and some of them are becoming more and more energy dependent. On the other hand we have been facing for quite a long time asymmetric threats like international terrorism, religious extremism, highly technological threats like cyber threats, missiles strikes threats and so on. Nowadays terrorist organizations can conveniently use worldwide net to connive their wicked plots against the modern world.

As Ambassador Vershbow said in his speech at the Conference of the NATO Defense Ministers in Bratislava on 22nd October, 2009: "Poor governance and festering extremism far beyond NATO borders can have deadly implications for the security of our own populations"<sup>116</sup>.

In order to protect our home countries from such threats we need to look for them far beyond our territorial borders. That's why NATO countries are developing a new strategic concept that will be an instrument for the Alliance to most successfully meet and solve those challenges.

The situation in Afghanistan has created the most complex challenge for NATO and has put the credibility of the Alliance at stake. In order to answer challenges for ISAF and our partners over there, participants in London conference on Afghanistan in January decided to increase level of troops and to stay there until goals of operation are achieved<sup>117</sup>. We all hope that there will be a time soon when ANSF and the Afghan Government will take the lead in this operation and NATO forces, and other international players, and NGOs will play a supportive role.

## 2. Chronology of Conflict

NATO's operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. Established by UN mandate in 2001,

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<sup>114</sup> This keynote speech was delivered at an International Conference held in May, 2010 in Rakovski Academy.

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<sup>116</sup> Ambassador Alexander R. Vershbow, Crafting the new Strategic Concept: Ambitions, Resources, and Partnerships for a 21st Century Alliance, Keynote speech by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 22nd October, 2009, "New Challenges, Better Capabilities" Accompanying Conference of the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Bratislava.

<sup>117</sup> London Conference on Afghanistan, Communiqué, Afghanistan, <http://hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/communiqué/>.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under NATO leadership since August 2003.

In response to heinous terrorist attack on 9/11 2001 the international community firmly by the USA and unanimously supported the US administration in its efforts to recover from the strike and produce countermeasures in neutralizing further threats. For the first time in history of the Alliance, right in the next day 9/12 North Atlantic Council invoked Article 5, of the Washington Treaty. The US administration and NATO took adequate steps to remove terrorist and supporters from their safe haven and to make sure that they never return there not new evil stratagems. In a matter of months the US military and their allies organized and conducted operation Enduring Freedom and by the end of March, 2002 drove the Taliban regime and drove the terrorist al Qaeda into worldwide flight. In December 2001 in Bonn, Germany, the UN organized and held talks to replace the future of Afghanistan. Participants adopted an Agreement that set the foundations for an Afghan Interim Authority and NATO-led ISAF in order to put post conflict period on the right track. That was how ISAF was commenced. Initially it was under British command, was authorized 5000 personnel strength, and was in charge of security of Kabul.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 dated Dec 20, 2001 to authorize comprehensive measures in fighting Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Following this resolution many countries joined efforts to bolster ISAF and Afghan Interim Government. In January 2002 a Conference on Afghanistan was organized and held in London. As a result many countries joined and signed the Memorandum of Understanding for reconstruction and security buildup. Bulgaria did sign the MoU as well.

Initially the efforts of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan were concentrated on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all tribal and armed factions. Following new developments mission, structure and tasks of the force have altered depending on situation.

On August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2003, NATO assumed responsibility of ISAF. The mission consisted of five phases:

- Phase 1 Assessment and preparation.
- Phase 2 Expansion of operation throughout Afghanistan.
- Phase 3 Stabilization.
- Phase 4/5 Hand over responsibility to Afghani Government.

On October 13<sup>th</sup>, 2003 UNSC voted Resolution 1510 to expand ISAF mission to Kandahar and Kabul. That's how expansion of ISAF took course and consequently regional commands were established. Initially German troops deployed to Konduz in late October, 2003 as part of security to first PRT. In the fall of 2005 elections for National Assembly and Provincial Councils were held for the first time. Shortly thereafter Canadian contingent redeployed to Kandahar and on July 31<sup>st</sup>, 2006 NATO officially assumed command of RC-South (Stage 3). On October RC-East was also established (Stage 4).

In the beginning there were two parallel military commands. The one was the US command (TF 180) that acted within the frame of operation Enduring freedom, and the other was NATO-led ISAF.

In March 2003 a US-led coalition started operation Iraqi Freedom, toppled Saddam Hussein's regime, disbanded Iraqi Military and Security Forces and set the

course for reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq. The US and coalition concentrated their primary attention on this operation. It attracted most of the financial, human and material resources and put operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF actions on the back burner.

That provided the Taliban with a chance to gradually reorganize and consolidate in the area of FATA, Pakistan. They built bases and training grounds there, recruited new fighters, and prepared for regaining power and influence in Afghanistan. In winters they trained and prepared, and in summer time they waged their offensives against coalition and Afghani institutions. By changing their strategy and tactics they succeeded to partially establish presence in country and then permeate there among local population. In the period of 2005–2008 they succeeded to settle in country and exert significant influence over the tribal population in South and East. To fund their operations they used external money channels and instigated poppy growing by the local population. Thus Afghanistan became the biggest drug producer in the world.

The GIRoA and ANSF could not successfully counter the Taliban. They have been accused of inefficiency, cronyism, and corruption. Taking account of this unfavorable situation the Alliance took steps to rectify it by expanding operations throughout country, cutting out Taliban human and financial support and change balance in ISAF's favor.

The whole strategy has been built around three fundamental pillars:

- Security;
- Stabilization and Reconstruction;
- Governance.

All efforts have concentrated on security and stability, providing favorable conditions of governing the whole country, recovery of economy and infrastructure, consolidation of tribes and getting Afghanistan on normal functioning in all main domains of life.

Recent history of the conflict started with the merge of US Forces and ISAF and assumption of command of ISAF by US general Dan McNeil in the beginning of 2007. This act put all forces together under one command and helped COMISAF apply unity of command and unity of effort in Theater. Since then a couple of successful operations were conducted mainly in the southern and eastern part of the country. Although successful they could not change dramatically strategic picture in Theater. The Taliban have continued to gain ground and influence, poppy growing has not been reduced to a significant extent, violence have soared, borders with Pakistan remained porous and local population was at disarray.

That's why in 2009 new administration of the President of the US took over decisive steps to assess the situation and to set the course of operation towards a successful end. The COMISAF Gen Stanley McChrystal and his staff conducted a comprehensive assessment of the overall situation in Afghanistan and produced a report which stated that a new COA should be persevered in order to change the balance. In short this report said that: "The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community – that undermines

our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.”<sup>118</sup>

Nevertheless the above mentioned, success is achievable by reinforcing ISAF with more resources and fielding ISAF and regional commands with new strategy, that joins efforts of ISAF, civilian actors, international and nongovernmental organization to weld the operation in an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign. Gen McChrystal states that a secure environment must be ensured by winning support of the local population and further accelerated build up and training of Afghan National Security Forces.<sup>119</sup>

COMISAF's report was submitted to POTUS and NATO Secretary General. Following deliberations on this report and some more analysis the POTUS in his speech in US Military Academy on Dec 1, 2009 committed 30 000 more troops to reinforce ISAF, and the rest of the NATO countries promised to add up 9000 more troops.

In January, this year ISAF participants held a conference in London, where they unanimously accepted a communiqué to draw down this new approach to the operation. The situation in Afghanistan has created the most complex challenge for NATO and has put the credibility of the Alliance at stake. In order to answer challenges for ISAF and our partners over there, participants decided to increase level of troops and to stay there until goals of operation are achieved<sup>120</sup>.

We all hope that there will be a time soon when ANSF and the Afghan Government will take the lead in this operation while NATO forces, and other international players, and NGOs will play a supportive role.

### **3. Current Situation**

#### **3.1. Insurgent Groups**

In his Initial Assessment COMISAF stated that ISAF faces Taliban dominated insurgency. In his Initial Assessment COMISAF stated that most insurgent fighters are Afghans. They are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan. They are aided by foreign fighters, elements of some intelligence agencies, and international funding, resources, and training. Foreign fighters provide materiel, expertise, and ideological commitment.

The insurgents wage a “silent war” of fear, intimidation, and persuasion throughout the year-not just during the warmer weather “fighting season” – to gain control over the population. These efforts make possible, in many places, a Taliban “shadow government” that actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures. Insurgent military operations attract more attention than this silent war but are only a supporting effort. Violent attacks are designed to weaken the government by demonstrating its inability to provide security, to fuel recruiting and financing efforts, to provoke reactions from ISAF that further alienate the population, and also to undermine public and political support for the ISAF mission in coalition capitals.

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<sup>118</sup> McChrystal Stanley, COMISAF's Initial Assessment (redacted), August 30, 2009, ISAF, p. 1-1

<sup>119</sup> Idem.

<sup>120</sup> London Conference on Afghanistan, Communiqué, Afghanistan, <http://hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/communique/>.

The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG). These groups coordinate activities loosely, often achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort, but they do not share a formal command-and-control structure. They also do not have a single overarching strategy or campaign plan. Each individual group, however, has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, and allocates resources accordingly. Each group has its own methods of developing and executing these plans and each has adapted over time. Despite the best efforts of GIRoA and ISAF, the insurgents currently have the initiative.<sup>121</sup>

The most likely Overarching Goal of the Taliban is to expel ISAF and all other international organizations from Afghanistan, to disrupt the GIRoA activities in their attempts to recover the country and to establish an Islamic Dominated State governed by them.


They intend to achieve this goal by pursuing aggressive kinetic tactics against the ISAF and ANSF and cause as many casualties as possible, disrupt governance and delegitimize the GIRoA, increase influence and base of popular support throughout country, and outlast ISAF.

### ***3.2. Lines Of Operation***

ISAF is in Afghanistan under a UN mandate to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. This is the main effort. NATO's longer-term strategy in its ISAF role is to support the international community's efforts towards the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, as mandated by UNSCR 1386, leading to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

**ISAF MISSION is:** ISAF, in support of GIRoA, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.<sup>122</sup>

### **ISAF ORGANIZATION**



<sup>121</sup> McChrystal Stanley, COMISAF's Initial Assessment (redacted), August 30, 2009, ISAF, p. 2-5, 2-6.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p.2-2; also ISAF home page: [www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/](http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/our-mission/).

ISAF comprises some 90 000 troops from 43 different countries deployed throughout Afghanistan. There are five regional commands and 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

**ISAF's CENTERS OF GRAVITY may be prioritized as follows:**

- The will and ability to provide for the security and the existential needs of the population;
- The capabilities to defeat the insurgents not only in kinetic terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population;
- Manning, equipping, and training larger and more effective Afghan National Security Forces that are capable of taking over security and stability in the country;
- Supporting the Afghani Government to apply governance, development, and reconstruction.
- Close collaboration with UNAMA, international and local NGO.

**MOST LIKELY OBJECTIVES:**

- Reverse Taliban momentum through sustained military action, disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, defeat any organized attempt of the insurgents to launch offensives against ISAF, GIRoA, and local population;
- Deny the Taliban, Al Qaeda and any other terrorist syndicate access to population, lines of communication, urban and production nodes, or resources;
- Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective Afghani government that serves the people and can eventually take over key security, social and economic functions. Coordinate all ISAF efforts and execute all actions through the Afghani Government;
- Assist the GIRoA in developing self-reliant ANSF that gradually take over security and stability of the country and play primary role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism whilst ISAF plays a supportive role.

**The new ISAF approach is pursued by so called  
POPULATION CENTRIC STRATEGY:**

***SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD, AND TRANSITION APPROACH***

- Shape: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.
- Clear: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;
- Hold: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space;
- Build: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
- Transition: Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Cordesman, Anthony Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010, Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 12, 2010, p. 19.

In the **Shape phase**, ISAF in collaboration with the Afghan Government, and other international players in country investigate and study all interconnections, key players, economics, infrastructure, tribal relationships, population tensions and concerns in order to improve status of local population.

ISAF, ANSF conduct reconnaissance to identify insurgents' intent and most likely COA, locate their elements and probable areas of their interventions. Deploy necessary forces to be ready to prevent, deny access, disrupt or defeat the insurgents. In brief shape means create favorable conditions to consequently win the battle.

In the **Clear phase**, ISAF and ANSF conduct military operations in order to defeat, destroy or expel the enemy from the AOR whilst protecting local population and avoiding civilian casualties. **Clear** means to deny the insurgents or any other terrorist or anti-government organization safe heaven to exist, organize and perpetrate their kinetic or nonkinetic attacks in a certain AOR.

In the **Hold phase**, ISAF, the GIRoA, UNAMA, NGO withstand and uphold the already cleared area and maintain security, stability, recovery and reconstruction. Law enforcement agencies enforce rule of law and maintain order. It is extremely important for the local governmental agencies to promote state policy and gain confidence of the population. That's is why in coordination with all agencies concerned they provide for the population anything necessary for them to sustain and recover, and discontinue illegal way of life (poppy growing, drug trafficking, support to insurgents and any other anti-government elements).

In the **Build phase**, ISAF and all other international organizations, and the Afghan Government are rebuilding infrastructure, industry and are pursuing better standards and education for the people of Afghanistan. The international organizations in place help people achieve better knowledge and practice in all domains of life.

According to ISAF home page ISAF extends the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. Further on as a major component of this mission is the establishment of professional Afghan National Security Forces that would enable Afghans to assume more and more responsibility for the security of their country.

Much progress has already been made. From a non-existent force in 2003, the Afghan army currently comprises approximately 100,130 soldiers, and has begun taking the lead in most operations. In his Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee general David Petraeus, Commander USCENTCOM says that in January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over 206,000 assigned, but significant work remains in improving the quality of the Afghan force through enhanced partnering, training, and recruiting. ISAF leadership has placed a premium on comprehensive partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is being demonstrated in the ongoing Operation Moshtarak, in which ISAF and ANSF operate at close to a one-to-one ratio. Of equal importance, ISAF and ANSF leaders worked together in partnership to plan all aspects of the operation, a signal of ANSF development that goes beyond the number of ANSF boots on the ground. A properly sized, trained, and equipped ANSF is a prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan, and through our support and the assistance of the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the ANSF will continue to expand so that they will be more able to meet their country's security needs.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Petraeus David, Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander U.S. Central

In addition to conducting security operations and building up the Afghan army and police, ISAF is also directly involved in facilitating the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan through 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are engaged in identifying reconstruction needs and supporting humanitarian assistance activities throughout the country.

In the **Transition stage** the GIROA and ANSF take over full responsibility of security, stability, and territorial integrity of the country. The transition process will enable the Afghan Government to progressively exercise its sovereignty, with the continuing support of ISAF. In their meeting in Tallinn, Estonia on 23 April, this year NATO foreign ministers agreed that this process will not be driven by the calendar, but when the conditions allow. It must be sustainable and irreversible.<sup>125</sup>

ANSF will develop the capabilities, to include the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan Gendarmerie Force, the Afghan Border Police, specialized counternarcotics units, and other security forces that will allow ISAF to transfer security responsibility to them.

#### **4. Bulgarian Armed Forces Participation In ISAF**

Following London Conference and in implementation of UNSC resolution 1536 the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria voted a unanimous decision to include the country in ISAF and to contribute to the operation by a platoon size, consequence management unit. Hence we started our participation in the ISAF operation by a 32 men strong platoon on Feb 16, 2002. The platoon deployed within the frame of the British component nearby Kabul. The consequent management platoon conducted its mission until August 2003. Upon change of situation in Afghanistan its mission was discontinued, and it was replaced by an infantry mechanized platoon.

In summer of 2003 a Mobile Training Team (MTT) were also sent there to contribute to Afghan National Army training. There were three teams of 18 instructors each that conducted training within TF PHOENIX of operation Enduring Freedom.

In 2005 HQ of the SEEBRIG<sup>126</sup> took part in ISAF operation for six months. It was commanded by a Bulgarian general, and there were 11 more Bulgarian military personnel in the HQ. An Air Traffic Control contingent 70 men strong from the Bulgarian Air Force was in charge of Kabul Airport for 3 months in 2006.

Following Riga Summit in 2006 and new commitments taken by all NATO member countries our government took a decision to significantly increase participation into the operation by a mechanized infantry company.

In order to further contribute to ISAF efforts to enhance security in the country we increased our troops there by another company and a guard platoon. Thus by 2008 from mere 32 men strong contingent at the inception of ISAF our troop level in operation reached around 530 personnel.

Currently we take part in ISAF by the following units and missions:

Regional Command CENTER (RC-C):

- A Mechanized Infantry Company;

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Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command 16 Mar 2010.

<sup>125</sup> NATO press release, NATO agrees roadmap for transition to Afghan lead, 24 April, 2010.

<sup>126</sup> SEEBRIG-South Eastern European Brigade.

- A Military Police Squad;
- Staff Officers;
- A Medical Team within the French Military Hospital.

#### Regional Command SOUTH (RC-S)

- A Guard Company;
- An OMLT.

#### Regional Command WEST (RC-W)

- Two medical teams within the Spanish Military Hospital.
- We also contribute with staff officers to ISAF HQ and RC-Capital.

### 5. SOME LESSONS LEARNED

In the end I would like to share with you all some of the problems that we have faced and some lessons that we have learned from our national experience in this operation.

In the course of participation in operations abroad we have experienced some problems. There are significant amount of forces, equipment and resources that we devote to these operations so that we must subtract huge amount of funding from our military budget. Another problem that we have struggled to solve is the mere distance of the AOR from home stations of the deployed units<sup>127</sup>. It makes it difficult for our commanders and headquarters to supply and support deployed troops in timely manner. Our leadership is trying hard to obtain reasonable airlift capabilities in order to deploy self sufficiently forces and resources. At the moment we still have some deficiencies in this field. We believe that perspective of using allied airlift capabilities with regard to C17 airplanes will resolve this need.

There have been difficulties for our troops to cope with to include factors like climate, local culture, religious idiosyncrasies, and language proficiency of the enlisted personnel, but we have learned our lessons and currently we are organizing training in such a manner that these factors do not hamper significantly mission accomplishment.

The Bulgarian Armed Forces have gained a significant experience in operations for support of international peace and security for the last 15 years. We have improved a lot our legislation concerning deploying troops abroad. Now it allows our leadership to deploy organizational units instead of mixed ones as it used to be before. We have also improved a lot all processes in a mission cycle: selection of personnel, training, testing and validation and overall preparation for the mission. What is more, we have improved not only in tactical and operational terms but also in strategic manner. Nowadays more and more levels of the Government are involved in strategic and operational decision making. Participation in NATO lead crisis response operations has transformed to a comprehensive State mission with a great importance that everybody pays very close attention.

We have achieved significant improvement in equipping the troops for PSO. New clothing with improved protective and thermal features was provided. The personnel is geared with stronger and lighter armored vests, better night vision goggles, and night aiming sights, personal web gear and all gadgets necessary for the soldier.

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<sup>127</sup> Just for information: distance to Iraq equals approximately 2500 km, and distance to Afghanistan equals approximately 4500 km.

Transportation means have become also better now. We broadly use 4D high mobility multipurpose vehicles, APC and transport trucks. They ensure better protection for personnel and higher reliability in operations.

We concentrated attention on gathering, analyzing, storing and disseminating lessons learned from operations. In this respect we intensively use NATO LL Database, and some other allies' ones. To this end we are working intensively on developing our own LL Database that accumulates national experience in operations but also includes applicable allied experience as well.

In his speech at the University of Chicago earlier this month the NATO SG Anders Fog Rasmussen pointed out some very useful strategic lessons learned that all ISAF planners may pay close attention. These are also LL that confluence from many pundits on Afghanistan and Pakistan, so as to mold common opinion among coalition in Afghanistan how can this campaign exit strategy draw to a successful conclusion.

- Engage the international community in more decisive actions to support the campaign:

The overarching goal still remains to create such conditions that prohibit the Taliban's return of control to Afghanistan, maintaining regional stability and preventing the country from becoming again a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach.

As the SG points out on strategic level NATO needs to institutionalize a broad and inclusive security dialogue and, where appropriate, partnership with relevant countries from around the world.<sup>128</sup> To this end NATO diplomatic efforts may be directed towards countries that do not participate in the campaign with troops but are very much interested in its outcome, i.e. Russia, China, India and Pakistan, to include all former Soviet republics in the area. The content of this dialogue will probably comprise ideas of improving and coordinating common efforts to establish peace and security in this beleaguered country and the whole region.

- Unite efforts of all organizations in place:

Through unity of command ISAF has succeeded to achieve significant degree of unity of effort. It is applicable to all international organizations in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and collaboration is badly needed in order for the mission to achieve the desired end state. ISAF, UNAMA, all NGO should act in consonance and coordinated fashion during hold, build and transition phases to recover the country and convince the Afghan people that there is a better way to live.

- Combine and integrate military and civilian actions:

The military mission cannot ultimately succeed until the civilian aspects – better governance, improved development, and a rising economy – succeed.<sup>129</sup> It is necessary that ISAF, the GIRoA and all rest take earnestly a comprehensive approach. At the national level, NATO Governments have generally moved towards a “whole of Government” approach to Afghanistan. At the international level, SG states, this lesson has not yet been learned. In this way there is no unity of action in coordinated fashion and there is squander of scarce resources.

The new integrated ISAF plan envisages that military and civilian plan and act together. That is why special civilian representatives to different levels were appointed.

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<sup>128</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Afghanistan and the Future of Peace Operations, Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the University of Chicago, NATO press release, 08 April, 2010.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

All hope that military and soft power will be weld in best fashion to work at local level and to achieve the overall mission. Attempts to reassert central government authority without a clear grasp of local power structures and relationships will only engender more popular resentment against Kabul that plays directly into the hands of the Taliban.<sup>130</sup> It is paramount that in the build phase such a state is institutionalized that is acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of the beholder-the Afghan people.

- Continue to increase the numbers, equip and train the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and all the rest law enforcement institutions:

Nothing could be achieved without proper environment of security and stability. All other actions are incongruent without security. The truth is that once an objective is cleared it must be held secure, otherwise insurgents flee and stay away until forces are on the spot. Once they leave the area the insurgents are back to take vengeance and rip the area again. This applies not only at local level but also to national one.

So it is very important for the country to have well trained and equipped forces that need very soon to take over security in their own hands. Unless they don't do it ISAF will have to continue securing the country. Immediate goals for the ANA is to reach 134000 and for the ANP-85000.

To all NATO countries that means that instead of peace enforcing and PK capabilities we will have to develop training capabilities as well.

- Develop, enhance and refine expeditionary capabilities:

Since operation Allied Effort in 1999 up to now it has been a common secret that NATO countries still need to develop deployable capabilities. That means lighter forces, strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, modularity and interoperability. In his speech in Chicago, SG points out the need to catch up with the US in this field.

## **6. CONCLUSION**

ISAF operation in Afghanistan is a sample of NATO unanimity and solidarity, and how the Alliance will build its future in the new Strategic Concept. There is no doubt that successful end will be accomplished and NATO will exit Afghanistan victorious and stronger. NATO IS DOOMED TO WIN. NATO countries and their partners will take pride of solidarity they have demonstrated, sacrifice they have made and results they have achieved to contribute to global security far beyond its territorial borders.

What is more, all will be done in the name of making the world a better place to live.

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<sup>130</sup> Nagl John, A Better War in Afghanistan, JFQ / issue 56, 1st quarter 2010.

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